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#2A-7/19/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
""A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2884 
ROSE BOCCIA et al. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100. SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 29, 1984. Rose Boccia and others employed at 
the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District 
(employer) filed a timely petition for decertification of 
Local 144, Division 100. Service Employees International 
Union, AFL-CIO (intervenor). the current negotiating repre-
sentative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: Cook, Assistant Cook, Full and 
Part-Time Food Service Workers, 
Lead Food Service Worker and Food 
Service Worker Driver. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, a secret ballot election 
was held on June 14, 1985. The results of this election 
show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit 
A 
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who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented 
for purposes of collective negotiations by the 
intervenor.— 
THEREFORE. IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and 
it hereby is. decertified as the negotiating agent for the 
unit. 
DATED: July 19. 19 8 5 
Albany. New York 
/Ac^JL (<• J/M <&UM<\<Z^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memhfer 
1/ Of the 41 ballots cast. 5 were for representation-and 
36 against representation. There were no challenged . 
ballots. 
#2B-7/19/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION. AFL-CIO. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7950 
DAVID G. LEEMHUIS. 
Charging Party. 
DAVID LEEMHUIS. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of David G. 
Leemhuis to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing Leemhuis1 
charge against the New York State Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF). Leemhuis is an employee of the State of New 
York, and is in a negotiating unit represented by PEF. He is 
not a member of PEF. but pays an agency shop fee. 
In his charge Leemhuis complains that PEF violated Section 
209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law. (1) by failing to refund the 
proper amount of his agency shop fee payment for the fiscal 
year ending March 31. 1984,- and (2) by failing to provide 
i/section 208.3(a) of the Taylor Law requires the 
refund of that "part of an agency shop fee deduction which 
represents the employee's pro rata share of expenditures ,by 
the organization in aid of activities or causes of a .' 
political or idealogical nature only incidentally related 
to terms and conditions of employment." 
$:9769 
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) 
sufficient financial information along with such refund. The 
Director dismissed the charge on the ground that it did not 
allege facts which constitute a violation of the Taylor 
2/ Law,— the first specification on the ground that a 
complaint relating to the amount of money refunded does not 
fall within the jurisdiction of this Board, the second on the 
ground that the facts alleged indicated that PEF provided 
sufficient financial information at the time of the refund. 
Both parts of the Director's determination are based 
upon our decision in Hampton Bays Teachers Association. 14 
PERB 1P018 (1981). With respect to the first specification 
we held that this Board does not have jurisdiction to 
) consider a charge alleging only that the amount of an agency 
shop fee refund is incorrect. Leemhuis contends that this 
holding was wrong and should be overruled. In support of 
this proposition he cites Leemhuis v. PEF. 17 PERB ir7518 
(Sup. Ct.. Sch. Co.. 1984) for the proposition that this 
Board has jurisdiction over complaints that a refund is 
inadequate, as evidenced by the court's direction that he 
exhaust his remedies before PERB before filing a law suit. 
The court decision does not support Leemhuis. In 
stating that he failed to exhaust his remedies before PERB. 
the lower court, citing Hampton Bays, noted "that PERB will 
i/section 204.2 of our Rules of Procedure. 
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refuse to review the inadequacies of an agency shop fee 
rebate . . .", but that Leemhuis failed to exhaust his 
remedies before PERB by not raising other issues before this 
agency. We also note that the State Supreme Court has 
recently confirmed a decision of this Board which restated the 
proposition that we do hot have jurisdiction over charges 
merely complaining about the inadequacies of the amount of a 
refund. Bodanza v. PERB. 18 PERB 1f7008 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co.. 
1985). 
Relating to Leemhuis1 second specification, we held in 
Hampton Bays that the minimum information that must be 
provided by an employee organization along with an agency shop 
refund is 
the basis of the Association's determination 
of the amount of the refund, including 
identification of those disbursements of the 
Association and its affiliates that are 
refundable and those that are not.3-/ 
The Director found, and the record establishes, that the 
Federation provided such information to Leemhuis. He 
argues, however, that the Federation is required to go 
further and provide "clear and convincing" evidence of the 
accuracy of the information it provides. We find that the 
Taylor Law does not impose such a burden upon an employee 
3/l4 PERB 1F3018. at p. 3031 (1981). See also 
footnote 2 of the cited decision which elaborates upon the 
extent of the duty to provide information. 
« 9770 
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organization. Public Employees Federation v. PERB. 93 AD2d 
910, 16 PERB ir7016 (3d Dept.. 1983) cited by Leemhuis does not 
support his position. In that decision the Appellate Division 
cited, with approval, our Hampton Bays decision and the 
standard contained therein for information to be provided 
along with agency shop fee refunds. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, and. 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19. 19 8 5 
Albany, New York 
vZD-e^j?^ <Z*>-**^-<7^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
NLJ*ti^ 
David C. Randies, Membe 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
9771 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS -. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7377 
BRUCE W. MARKENS. 
Charging Party. 
JERRY ROTHMAN, ESQ.. for the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (STEPHEN MENDELSOHN. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the United Federation of Teachers 
BRUCE W. MARKENS, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In November 1982, the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) decided 
to close Hughes High School and to reopen it as Humanities 
High School. It informed the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) that it did not consider itself bound to 
offer the Hughes teachers positions at Humanities because 
the academic program would be different. Markens was a 
teacher at Hughes and served as UFT Chapter Chairman .. . 
i 9772 
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there. He wrote several letters to UFT on his own behalf 
and on behalf of his fellow teachers complaining that the 
District's refusal to assign them to Humanities was a 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. UFT 
filed a grievance on behalf of all the affected teachers. 
Markens and several of the other teachers also filed 
individual grievances. 
While pressing for his return to Hughes/Humanities. 
Markens applied to several other schools as alternatives. 
Among the other schools to which he applied were Middle 
College High School and the High School of Art and 
Design. However, when school reopened in September 1983, 
Markens was not assigned to any of the three. He then 
filed a grievance complaining that he was not appointed to 
Middle College. He filed no grievance with respect to Art 
and Design but complained that he was not appointed there 
because UFT feared that he might run successfully for the 
position of Chapter Chairman at that school, thereby 
depriving a favored union member of the position. 
Eventually the UFT grievance involving 
Hughes/Humanities was settled. By its terms, Markens was 
to be returned to that school on February 1, 1984, if 
there were a vacancy, and in any event, not later than 
September 1. 1984. In fact, Markens was assigned to 
i 9773 
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Humanities in February 1984. At this point, UFT ceased 
processing Markens' grievance regarding Middle College. 
Its reason was that it had understood Markens' primary 
interest to be his return to Hughes/Humanities. It did 
not. however, tell this to Markens. the record indicating 
that there was some confusion in their understanding of 
one another. 
Markens' charge contains several specifications 
complaining about UFT. The complaints relate to: (1) a 
claimed failure to process his Humanities grievance; (2) a 
claimed failure to keep him informed as to the progress of 
the UFT Humanities grievance; (3) a claimed failure to 
process his Middle College grievance expeditiously; (4) a 
claimed failure to inform him that it was dropping that 
grievance; and (5) UFT's alleged collusion with the 
District, in depriving him of a position at Art and Design. 
The charge also specifies several violations by the 
District. These include complaints that the District 
violated its contract with UFT in not appointing him to 
Humanities, and that it acted collusively with UFT in 
denying him an appointment to Art and Design. 
As the charge was unclear, the ALJ found it necessary 
to hold three pre-hearing conferences to clarify it. The 
last of these was held immediately prior to the first 
I 9774 
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scheduled hearing. At that time, the ALJ dismissed the 
charges against the District. Those complaining about a 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement were 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Those complaining 
about collusion between the District and UFT in denying 
Markens an appointment to Art and Design were dismissed on 
the ground that the charge contained no relevant 
allegations of fact, there being only conclusory 
statements. 
The ALJ dismissed Markens' specifications against UFT 
complaining of collusion in denying him an appointment to 
Art and Design for the same reason. Dealing with Markens' 
specifications alleging a violation of duty of fair 
representation in the handling of the Humanities and 
Middle College grievances, the ALJ found that the evidence 
did not establish any violation. 
The matter now comes to us on Markens' exceptions. 
In addition to appealing from the ALJ's decision 
dismissing his several specifications, he also complains 
that: (1) the ALJ denied him a hearing on the Art and 
Design specifications; (2) the ALJ held the first hearing 
immediately after the third pre-hearing conference instead 
of waiting five days as required by §204.6 of our Rules of 
Board - U-7377 -5 
Procedure;— and (3) the ALJ permitted UFT to present 
evidence on January 7. 1985 instead of closing the hearing 
on November 29, 1984. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
With respect to Art and Design, the charge did not 
contain allegations of fact as required by §204.1(b)(3) 
and §204.2(a) of our Rules. Accordingly, the ALJ properly 
dismissed these allegations notwithstanding the conclusory 
statements alleging collusive action between the District 
and UFT. It follows that the ALJ properly refused to hold 
a hearing on these specifications of the charge. 
With respect to Markens1 complaint that there was a 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement, this 
Board does not have jurisdiction over such an 
2/ 
allegation.— 
The record supports the ALJ's determination that UFT 
kept Markens sufficiently informed as to the progress 
regarding the Humanities grievance. The ALJ was also 
!/Rules, §204.6 provides: 
At least five working days prior to the 
scheduled date for the formal hearing, the 
administrative law judge designated by the • 
Director shall hold a pre-hearing 
conference for the purpose of clarification' 
of issues. 
^/civil Service Law. §205.5(d). 
t 9776 
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correct in determining that UFT's handling of the 
Humanities grievance was reasonable and appropriate. 
The ALJ properly determined that there was no 
violation of the duty of fair representation in UFT's 
handling of the Middle College grievance. While it did 
not tell Markens its reasons for not pressing the 
grievance after it won him reinstatement to Humanities, 
this failure was a result of a misunderstanding and did 
not amount to gross negligence or irresponsibility. The 
ALJ complied with Rule §204.6. The third pre-hearing 
conference, which was held the same day as the hearing, 
was nothing more than an off-the-record discussion which 
.) was held to further clarify issues that had not been made 
clear during the two prior conferences. We do not read 
this Rule as precluding such an off-the-record discussion 
before the commencement of a hearing. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to 
grant UFT an adjournment in order to present its 
3/ 
evidence— because several of Markens' causes of action 
were made clear only on the day of hearing. 
1/Rules. §204.7(k) provides: 
At the discretion of the administrative law 
judge, the hearing may be continued from 
day to day or to a later day or another 
place, by announcement thereof at the 
hearing or by other appropriate notice. 
v-
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 1985 
Albany. New York 
HaroLd-i R. Newman, Chairman 
VUsUl'^-
David C. Randies. Memb 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7957 
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY UNIT #8400. CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AFSCME, 
Charging Party. 
STEPHEN J. EASTER. COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (CLAUDIA R. 
McKENNA. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the St. Lawrence County 
Unit #8400. Civil Service Employees Association. AFSCME 
(CSEA). It alleges that the County of St. Lawrence 
(County) violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law by not 
paying longevity increments after December 31. 1984, as 
required by a collective bargaining agreement which expired 
that day. In its answer the County asserts that the 
expired agreement contained a sunset provision applicable 
to longevity pay which relieved it of any obligation to 
make such payments after December 31. 1984. 
k 9779 
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the 
charge without reaching its merits because she found that 
the collective bargaining agreement had not expired. 
Before the expiration of that agreement, the parties 
commenced negotiations for its successor. In connection 
with those negotiations the parties agreed upon ground 
rules which were executed on September 13, 1984, by Stephen 
Ragan, a CSEA field representative, and John Krol, 
Administrative Assistant to the County Board of 
Legislators. One of the ground rules was: "The present 
contract will remain in effect until a new agreement is 
reached". 
The ALJ determined that the matter is governed by City 
of Saratoga Springs. 18 PERB ir3009 (1985). in which we 
found that an extension of benefits clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement precluded a violation of §209-a.l(e). 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of CSEA. It 
argues that agreed upon ground rules for negotiations are 
distinguishable from an extension of benefits clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement. It contends that the 
ground rules do not meet the criteria for an agreement set 
forth in §201.12 of the Taylor Law and that they are. 
therefore, not enforceable as a contract right. 
We find no convincing basis in either law or logic for 
Board - U-7957 -3 
distinguishing between a clause of an agreed upon ground 
rule and one of a prior collective bargaining agreement 
with respect to the extension of the prior agreement. In 
the course of determining the ground rules, the parties 
entered into, and executed, what we conclude to be a 
supplementary written agreement providing for the extension 
of that basic agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the 
determination of the ALJ that the parties' basic agreement 
has not expired and that no violation of §209-a.l(e) of the 
Taylor Law has occurred— . 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 1985 
Albany. New York 
^^^Jj/r, A/far* 
Harold R./TSFewmah, Chai rman 
- „ -rf\^^aX/^ 
David C. Randle^. Member/ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
i/There is a grievance pending which raises the 
question whether the County violated the collective 
bargaining agreement by failing to pay increments. Nothing 
herein shall preclude CSEA from renewing its charge before 
this Board if the grievance fails because a court or an 
arbitrator concludes that the basic agreement expired in 
that it was not extended. 
#2E-7/19/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
"V PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK and LOCAL 418. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Respondents. 
-and- CASE NO. U-5998 
LUIS DIAZ. 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (MAURICE L. MILLER. ESQ. and 
SCOTT E. KRESCH. ESQ., of Counsel), for the State 
of New York 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (MICHAEL J. SMITH. 
ESQ, of Counsel), for Local 418, Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME, 
~) AFL-CIO 
AUGUST J. GINOCCHIO, ESQ.. for Luis Diaz 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Luis Diaz, a long-time employee of New York State's 
Department of Mental Hygiene, was suspended and then fired by 
the State of New York (State) for allegedly abusing a patient 
at the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center. He was a member of the 
negotiating unit represented by Local 418. Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO 
(CSEA), and he sought its assistance in filing a grievance. 
CSEA's contract with the State provided for mutually-
exclusive alternative procedures. Ordinary grievances, were' 
) to be filed with the State, and could go through several ' 
steps culminating in arbitration, but where an employee was 
I 9782 
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suspended there was an option of seeking immediate 
arbitration. To invoke this procedure, the demand for 
arbitration had to be filed with the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) rather than with the State. 
Diaz, after consultation with Bertini, the CSEA grievance 
representative, decided on immediate arbitration. However, 
Bertini filed the papers with the State instead of with the 
AAA. He did not discover his mistake until the time for 
filing with the AAA had passed. When he did so file, the 
State objected that the filing was not timely and the 
arbitrator dismissed the grievance. 
Using a private attorney, Diaz challenged the 
arbitrator's award and he was successful at Special Term. The 
State appealed and CSEA supported the position of the State. 
The Special Term decision was reversed and the arbitration 
award was reinstated. 
In the charge herein Diaz complains: 
1. That the State coerced two of his fellow 
employees into making statements that were critical 
of him. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed 
this specification on the ground that it did not 
constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. Diaz' 
exceptions challenge the ruling. 
2. That CSEA was grossly negligent and 
irresponsible in misfiling the demand for 




the ground that Bertini's conduct constituted no more 
than ordinary negligence. Analyzing our decisions 
and those of the NLRB and the various federal courts 
in duty of fair representation cases, the ALJ 
concluded that ordinary negligence is not sufficient 
to constitute a violation of that duty. The ALJ also 
rejected, as irrelevant, the proposition that if 
Bertini had been better trained by CSEA, he would 
have avoided his mistake. Diaz' exceptions challenge 
these conclusions. 
That CSEA had a special obligation to him. by 
reason of its negligence, which it violated by not 
supporting his challenge to the dismissal of the 
arbitration award. Moreover, according to Diaz, CSEA 
compounded its violation of this obligation by 
supporting the State's appeal from a court decision 
finding merit in this challenge. 
This specification duplicates one made in an 
earlier charge. That charge was dismissed by this 
Board in Local 418. CSEA (Diaz). 16 PERB ir3108 
(1983), and our decision was affirmed by the State 
Supreme Court. Luis F. Diaz v. PERB and Local 418. 
CSEA. 17 PERB ",[7013 (Albany Co., 1984). The ALJ 
determined that this specification should be 
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. Diaz'• 
exceptions challenge this determination. 
Board - U-5998 -4 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ that the 
specification of the charge complaining about the conduct of 
the State does not allege a violation of the Taylor Law. We 
also affirm his determination that the specification of the 
charge complaining about CSEA's conduct with respect to the 
appeal from the arbitration award is barred by res judicata. 
The remaining specification, that CSEA acted irresponsibly or 
was grossly negligent by reason of Bertini's conduct and the 
inadequacy of the training that it gave Bertini. requires 
further consideration. 
The ALJ correctly stated that the test for whether a 
union violates its duty of fair representation is to ascertain 
whether its action was improperly motivated, irresponsible or 
grossly negligent. This test was articulated by us in Nassau 
Educational Chapter. CSEA. Inc., 11 PERB IPOIO (1978), and is 
consistent with the weight of opinion in the private 
sector.— There is no record evidence that CSEA was 
i^The opinion of the ALJ provides a thorough analysis 
of the varient opinions of the several circuit courts. 
These range from the 7th Circuit's position that only 
intentional misconduct can establish a breach of the duty 
of fair representation, even grossly negligent mistakes not 
being sufficient, to that of the 6th Circuit which has 
opined that a grievance representative's good faith 
ignorance of controlling contractual provisions might 
constitute a violation. The ALJ's decision also correctly 
reports the majority view, that negligence alone does not 
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation, but 
egregious conduct does establish such a breach. 
r.978^ 
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improperly motivated either in its handling of the grievance 
or its training of the grievance representative. Attention 
must therefore be focused on whether CSEA's conduct was 
irresponsible or grossly negligent. 
In resolving this question, we find it necessary to 
define these terms with more precision than previously 
required. New York Jurisprudence draws a distinction between 
2/ 
ordinary negligence and gross negligence.— It indicates 
that ordinary negligence involves the absence of that degree 
of care and vigilence which a reasonable person would use. 
Gross negligence, on the other hand, is explained as a 
failure to exercise even slight diligence. Another 
perspective on the meaning of these words can be gleaned from 
Penal Law §15.05 which defines both recklessness and criminal 
negligence, the criminal law analogs of the civil law 
concepts of irresponsibility and gross negligence. 
The Penal Law indicates that a reckless person is one 
who: 
is aware of and consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . . 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that 
a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation. 
A criminally negligent person, on the other hand, is one who: 
2/41 NY Jur.. Negligence, §27. 
" 9786 
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fails to perceive a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk . . . . The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that disregard 
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation. 
The difference between recklessness or irresponsibility on 
the one hand and criminal negligence or gross negligence on 
the other goes to the knowledge of the negligent person. In 
both instances, however, the risk taken by the negligent 
person must be egregious or a gross deviation from what a 
"reasonable person would observe in the situation." Thus, 
while the culpability of the grossly negligent person is 
obviously less than that of the irresponsible offender, it 
is appreciably greater than that required for finding 
ordinary negligence by reason of the degree of the risk 
involved and the gross deviation from ordinary standards of 
care. Whether or not CSEA's conduct violated these 
standards involves a conclusion of fact and not of law. 
The first action of CSEA that is alleged to be 
irresponsible or grossly negligent is that Bertini misfiled 
the grievance. This alone is clearly insufficient to 
indicate irresponsibility or gross negligence. The 
situation, however, is complicated by the fact that after 
Bertini filed the grievance, he was advised by the State's 
designee for agency level hearings that he should check on 
the matter because no arbitration had been set up. Alerted 
by this cautionary advice, Bertini made some inquiries to 
K 9787 
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ascertain whether he had followed the correct procedure. A 
local CSEA field representative was not sufficiently 
knowledgable to correct his mistake and CSEA's administrator 
of arbitrations was on vacation. Accordingly, Bertini did 
not discover his error in time. 
We find that Bertini was negligent in his handling of 
Diaz' grievance in that his failure to read the instrument 
establishing the grievance procedure carefully evidenced the 
absence of that degree of care that a reasonable person would 
have used under the circumstances. We do not find, however, 
that this omission amounted to gross negligence, since the 
language of the instrument is not so easily understood. 
Further, his efforts after the filing did not constitute a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation as his 
questioning of other CSEA representatives did not disclose 
his filing error, and the information given to him by the 
State's representative did not apprise him. with certainty, 
that there had been a mistake. 
It follows a fortiari that Bertini's conduct was not 
irresponsible as Bertini did not know of. and disregard, the 
risk that Diaz' grievance would not qualify for arbitration. 
Rejecting the ALJ's view that the issue is irrelevant, 
we next address the question of whether CSEA was 
irresponsible or grossly negligent in that it did not provide 
adequate training to its grievance representative or provide 
K- 9788 
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sufficient organizational support for a neophyte. The record 
shows that Bertini had been appointed to his position only a 
few months prior to the filing of the Diaz grievance and that 
Diaz' case was his first involving a suspended employee. It 
further indicates CSEA's expectation that its grievance 
representatives would learn by on-the-job exposure to actual 
situations. This approach involves some risk. CSEA contends, 
however, that its conduct does not constitute irresponsibility 
or gross negligence. We disagree. 
The right of public employees to be represented in 
grievances is one of the most important afforded by the Taylor 
3/ Law.— Indeed, it is one of the fundamental reasons why 
employee organizations are granted certification or 
4/ 
recognition.- Although, in particular cases, an employee 
5/ 
organization may decide not to file or support a grievance.— 
6 / 
it must evaluate and process grievances conscientiously.— 
By delegating its responsibility to represent its unit 
.^/section 203 of the Taylor Law. 
4/section 208.1(a) of the Taylor Law. 
ii/scio-Allentown Teachers Assn. 10 PERB 1f3050 (1977). 
ii/compare Union of Security Personnel of Hospitals. 251 
NLRB 219. 1983-84 CCH NLRB Decisions iri5.911 (1983). in which 
a union was found to violate the duty of fair representation 
because its handling of a grievance was perfunctory. 
Board - U-5998 -9 
members in grievances to a representative who is inadequately 
prepared to perform this function and without providing that 
representative with adequate organizational support, an 
employee organization violates a fundamental responsibility. 
This is true whether the representative is a paid employee of 
the employee organization or volunteer fellow employee of the 
grievants. 
At the oral argument. CSEA pointed out that Bertini had 
been appointed a grievance representative only a few months 
before Diaz sought his assistance, and it argued that, by 
reason of its size, the number of its grievance 
representatives, and the turnover among such representatives, 
it could not maintain a fully trained cadre of grievance 
representatives. Given the importance of this post, we are 
not persuaded by this argument. On the contrary, in the 
absence of evidence as to the efforts it made to satisfy its 
obligation to provide adequately trained grievance 
representatives to its unit members, CSEA's argument suggests 
that it made a value judgment to try to represent unit 
members with inadequately trained grievance representatives. 
If so, it may have consciously disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that Bertini would not perform his 
assignment adequately, in which event its conduct would have 
been irresponsible. We do not. however, have to reach this 
conclusion to find that CSEA violated its duty of fair 
9790 
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representation to Diaz. It is sufficient that we find that 
it failed to apprehend the risk, that such failure 
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
that it should reasonably be held to. and that such failure 
had a proximate relationship to Bertini's mistake in the 
filing for arbitration. 
The last substantive matter that we address is an 
argument raised by CSEA that it cannot be found to have 
violated its duty of fair representation because its conduct 
was not "deliberate" and that §209-a.2 specifies that only 
actions taken deliberately may constitute improper employee 
organization practices. 
We find that the use of the word "deliberate" in 
§209-a.2 does not mean that a violation occurs only when an 
employee organization intends the consequences of its 
action. It is sufficient that the action or omission was 
deliberate in that the conduct itself, rather than its 
consequence, was intended. This is made clear by §209-a.l of 
the Taylor Law which specifies employer improper practices. 
There, too, we find reference to the word "deliberately" but 
for some violations that word is supplemented by the phrase, 
"for the purpose of". In that context, deliberately must 
mean that the act is intended while "for the purpose of" must 
mean that the consequences are intended. 
Having determined that CSEA violated its duty of fair 
representation to Diaz by not furnishing him with an 
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adequately trained grievance representative, we are 
confronted with the question of what remedy is appropriate. 
The Taylor Law provides that an offending party may be 
directed to take such affirmative action as will compensate 
an employee for lost wages, but not to pay exemplary 
7/ . . damages.— Applying this principle here, we note the 
holding of the United States Supreme Court that a union may 
not be held liable for those damages suffered by an employee 
because of the employer's alleged breach of contract, but 
increases, if any. in those damages- caused by the union's 
failure to process a grievance may properly be charged to the 
8 / 9 / 
union.— Thus, the 7th Circuit— refused to enforce an 
order of the NLRB directing a union to make whole an employee 
who had been discharged by her employer. It indicated that 
absent a determination on the merits that the employee was 
improperly discharged, the make whole remedy might constitute 
a windfall for her and reward her for her misconduct, while 
constituting exemplary damages against the union. 
Z/CSL §205.5(d) . 
i/Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) at 195. 
^United Steel Workers v. NLRB. 692 F.2d 1052, 95 LC 
1fl3.824 (1982). 
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Unfortunately, we cannot order that CSEA submit this 
matter for a determination on the merits by an arbitrator 
because there has already been a determination that 
arbitration is barred. Under such circumstances, in the 
private sector, the normal procedure where the union has 
violated its duty of fair representation by ineptly filing a 
grievance— is to order the union to pay the claimant's 
fees for independent counsel— in connection with a law 
suit to be filed by the claimant against his employer under 
12/ §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.— Such an 
action is available in the private sector where a claimant 
has been denied the opportunity to arbitrate the merits of 
his claim by reason of the union's violation of its duty of 
fair representation. 
No New York State statute parallels LMRA §301. However, 
the Appellate Division 4th Department has ruled that none is 
required because the right to bring such an action is 
13/ grounded in the common law of this State.— 
iP-/see Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.. 511 F. 
Supp. 719, 95 LC iri3,765 (ND. Cal.. 1981). 
ii^This is done where, as here, the union cannot 
satisfy its duty to represent the employee in an action 
against the employer because its interests and those of the 
employee have become adverse. 
i2/29 U.S. §185. 
^ - / J a c k s o n v . Regional T r a n s i t S e r v i c e . 54 A.D.2d 305 
(1976) . 
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We find that it is an appropriate remedy to direct 
CSEA to pay Diaz' reasonable legal fees and expenses in 
a common law action which he may choose to bring against 
the State. In doing so, we express no opinion as to 
whether the State may successfully raise procedural 
defenses to a judicial consideration of the merits of 
14/ its discharge of Diaz.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER CSEA to reimburse Diaz for 
his reasonable legal fees and expenses in connection 
with a lawsuit against the State for unlawful discharge, 
should he choose to bring such a lawsuit. 
DATED: July 19. 1985 
Albany. New York 
^ff-fr^U-^^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
•i!./lt is premature to consider alternative procedures 
for ascertaining whether Diaz was improperly discharged. 
Cf. United Steel Workers v. NLRB. supra, and Goolsby v. 
City of Detroit. Mich. (Dec. 10, 1984) at fn. 14. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
-\ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT. AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-69 53 
BEATRICE KAUDER. 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (STEPHEN MENDELSOHN, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BEATRICE KAUDER, p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Beatrice 
Kauder to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing her charge against the United Federation of 
Teachers. Local 2. AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT). Kauder had worked for 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) for 
three years as a secretarial intern and then became a regular 
school secretary. The District gave her one year's salary 
credit for her three years' work as a secretarial intern. 
Claiming that she was entitled to three years' salary credit, 
Kauder asked UFT to file a grievance on her behalf, but UFT 
refused to do so. 
The charge alleges that UFT breached its duty of fair 
representation to Kauder in that 1) it refused to file the 
' 9 * 7 9 5 
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grievance, and 2) it gave her an inadequate and incorrect 
explanation for its refusal to do so. 
The ALJ dismissed the first specification, finding that 
UFT refused to file the grievance because it concluded that 
Kauder was only entitled to one year's salary credit for her 
three years' work as a secretarial intern. He dismissed the 
second specification, finding that it gave her a full and 
correct explanation. 
Reviewing the record, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
UFT concluded that Kauder's right to salary credit for her work 
as a secretarial intern is determined by Part C of §491 of the 
bylaws of the District's Board of Education. It provides that 
salary credit for experience as a school secretary "may be 
allowed as follows: 
For two years of such experience . . 1 year 
For four years of such experience. . 2 years" 
As Kauder had more than two but less that four years of 
experience as a secretarial intern, UFT agreed with the 
District's action allowing her one year's salary credit. We 
find no basis in the record for finding that UFT's conclusion 
was not reached in good faith. 
We also find that the record establishes that UFT informed 
Kauder of the basis for its determination. 
In her exceptions, Kauder now argues that UFT engaged in 
discriminatory behavior against her and the other secretarial 
interns in that it had not "negotiated the benefit of full 
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salary credit." This allegation was not specified in the 
original charge and is dismissed for that reason.— We do 
note, however, that the duty of fair representation does not 
preclude an employee organization from reaching agreements in 
negotiations that are more favorable to some unit employees 
2/ 
than to others.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 19, 1985 
Albany, New York 
y^sit*^*-^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memosr 
1/city of Mount Vernon. 14 PERB tf3037 (1981); East 
Moriches Teachers Assn., 14 PERB 1[3056 (1981). 
^State of New York. 14 PERB ir3043 (1981); 
Plainview-Old Bethpaqe CSD. 7 PERB 1P058 (1974). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7438 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF 
MOUNT VERNON, 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL. ESQ. 
and ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Police Association of the City of Mount Vernon 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge against the City of Mount 
Vernon (City). The charge alleges that the City violated 
its duty to negotiate in good faith by submitting to 
interest arbitration a demand which constitutes a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
The demand complained about would disqualify certain 
unit employees from health insurance coverage under the 
* 9798 
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parties' collective bargaining agreement: 
if they are eligible for coverage under 
the plan of a spouse, provided the 
spouse's coverage is comparable to the 
health insurance plan being provided by 
the City for other members of the 
bargaining unit. 
This disqualification' would apply to newly hired employees 
and to present employees who withdraw from the current 
plan and later seek to reenter it. 
In arguing that the demand is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, the Association first contends that it is 
prohibited by Executive Law §296.1(a). That law 
prohibits, inter alia, discrimination by an employer 
because of the "marital status of any individual." 
It is clear that the City's negotiation demand would 
discriminate between unit employees based upon the 
circumstance that a unit employee is, or is not, married 
to someone who is covered by a health insurance plan that 
meets certain specifications. The ALJ determined that 
such discrimination does not violate Executive Law 
§296.1(a). She based her conclusion upon a decision of 
the New York State Court of Appeals in Pizza Hut v. Human 
Rights Appeal Board. 51 N.Y.2d 506 (1980). 
In that case the Court of Appeals found that an 
employer's antinepotism policy did not violate the 
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statute. It held that the statute merely precluded 
discrimination because of the "marital status" of a 
person, that is. whether the person is "divorced, 
separated, widowed, or single." It distinguished marital 
status from marital relationships, a term it used to refer 
to "an identification of one's present or former spouse 
and . . . the spouse's occupation."— The ALJ 
analogized a spouse's insurance coverage to a spouse's 
occupation and determined that distinctions based upon the 
former, no less than upon the latter, are not unlawfully 
discriminatory under Executive Law §296.1(a). We affirm 
this determination. 
The Association's second argument is that the City's 
demand is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation because 
its provisions would affect persons who are not parties to 
the collective bargaining agreement. To support this 
proposition the Association cites Schmitt v. Leonard. 77 
Misc.2d 435 (Nassau Co. 1974). aff'd. 45 A.D.2d 991 (2d 
Dept. 1974). a case in which a clause of a collective 
bargaining agreement was held not to limit the authority 
of a municipal civil service commission which was not 
party to the agreement. The ALJ determined that this 
i/see also Campbell Plastics. Inc. v. Human Rights 
Appeal Board. 81 A.D.2d 991 (3rd Dept. 1981). 
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decision is not applicable to the instant case. We affirm 
this determination. The demand in the instant case would 
impose no restrictions upon anyone who is not a party to 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
Finally, the Association argues that the demand 
should be declared nonmandatory because it might deny 
health insurance coverage to a unit employee if a spouse 
ceases to be covered by a comparable insurance policy or 
if both the unit employee and spouse are covered by 
collective bargaining agreements with provisions denying 
eligibility for health insurance where a spouse is 
covered. Assuming that these would be the consequences of 
2/ the City's demand,— they are relevant to the merits of 
the demand but not to the mandatory nature of its 
negotiability. Accordingly, we find this argument is not 
a basis for reversing the decision of the ALJ. 
2/lt is far from clear that this would be the case. 
The demand is for a clause declaring unit employees to be 
ineligible "for health insurance by the City if. they are 
eligible for coverage under the plan of a spouse . . . ." 
(emphasis supplied) V^  
98Q1 
Board - U-7438 -5 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: July 19. 19 8 5 
Albany. New York 
^L^e^/)^u Vfaif-pis^**^. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
kiALz. CcZ, 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH TONAWANDA UNITED TEACHERS. 
Respondent. CASE NO. D-023 8 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 20, 1985, Martin L. Barr, this agency's Counsel, 
)^ filed a charge alleging that the North Tonawanda United 
Teachers (NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO) (Respondent) had violated 
Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, 
encouraged, condoned and engaged in a four (4) workday strike 
against the North Tonawanda City School District (District) 
commencing May 21, 1985. 
The charge further alleged that from 288 to 301 
employees, out of a 329-member negotiating unit, principally 
teachers, participated in the strike. 
The Respondent requested Counsel to indicate the penalty 
he would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate 
i- 9803 
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for the violation charged. Respondent proposed not to file 
an answer, and thereby admit the factual allegations of the 
charge, on the understanding that Counsel would recommend and 
this Board would accept, a penalty of loss of Respondent's 
right to have dues and agency shop fees deducted for a period 
of six months, commencing with the start of the 1985-86 
school year.— Counsel has so recommended. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
Respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is 
a reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
rights of the North Tonawanda United Teachers be suspended, 
commencing on the first practicable date after September 1, 
1985. and continuing for such period of time during which 
fifty per cent (50%) of its annual agency shop fees, if any, 
and dues would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the North 
i/The employer advises that the annual dues are 
deducted over 20 pay periods because almost all unit 





Tonawanda City School District until the Respondent affirms 
that it no longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government as required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: July 19. 1985 
Albany. New York 
W^*£- C&t>CS~-XL^&~^i 
HaroL& R- Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2830 




NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
EUGENE F. PIGOTT. JR.. ESQ. (MICHAEL A. CONNORS. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Employer 
MICHALEK. MONTROY. AMAN. MARRANO. TRAFALSKI & GORSKI. 
ESQS. (JEROME C. GORSKI. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Petitioner 
HARDER. SILBER & GILLEN. ESQS. (JEFFREY DANA GILLEN. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The petition herein was filed by the United Professional 
Nurses Association (UPNA), which sought to represent 167 nurses 
employed by Erie County's Community Health Division. Of these. 
124 are full-time employees, all of whom are in a county-wide 
unit of about 700 nurses represented by the New York State 
Nurses Association (NYSNA), which intervened in the 
proceeding. The remaining 43 employees sought by UPNA are 
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unrepresented part-time nurses who work 18 hours a week.— 
As an alternative to the unit of 167 nurses, UPNA also sought a 
unit of the 43 part-timers. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) determined that the record does not 
support fragmentation of the existing unit by removing the 124 
full-time nurses of the Community Health Division from it. and 
UPNA has not filed exceptions to this part of his decision. He 
also found that a separate unit of the unrepresented part-time 
nurses was not appropriate because "they would appear to be an 
appropriate addition to the existing unit of their professional 
peers." However, instead of adding them to that unit, he 
dismissed the petition because "neither the intervenor nor the 
employer at this time seeks such an addition, and . . . the 
petitioner has expressed no interest in representing a larger 
unit . . . ." 
The matter comes to us on UPNA's exceptions to this part 
of the Director's decision. It argues that the decision "does 
not effectuate the purposes of the act" in that it precludes 
the representation of employees. NYSNA has filed a response in 
which it supports the Director's decision dismissing the 
petition, but asserts that it had taken the position that the 
unrepresented nurses should be added to its existing unit. The 
i^The NYSNA unit contains part-time nurses who work at 
least 40 hours per bi-weekly pay period. 
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record supports this assertion. Erie County filed no papers in 
response to the exceptions; it stands upon its position before 
the Director, which is that the 43 part-timers do not 
constitute an appropriate unit by themselves, and "[t]he 
question of whether or not a larger unit of part-time nurses 
would be appropriate is not at issue and, therefore, not 
addressed." 
While affirming the determination of the Director that the 
43 part-timers do not constitute an appropriate unit by 
themselves, we are nevertheless mindful of the concern 
expressed in the exceptions that dismissal of the petition 
might deprive employees of representation rights afforded them 
2/ 
by the Taylor Law.— This undesirable result would be 
avoided if the most appropriate unit for the part-timers is one 
which combines them with all or some of the employees of the 
unit represented by NYSNA. and includes no employees now in any 
3 / 
other unit.— Such alternative unit structures can, and 
should, be considered. 
•i./lf the Director's decision is affirmed and the petition 
dismissed, the part-timers will have no representation at least 
until the next window period, when NYSNA may file a petition to 
represent them. As NYSNA is currently in negotiation for a 
collective bargaining agreement, that window period may be 
several years off, depending upon the length of the contract to 
be negotiated. 
1/The unchallenged decision of the Director merely holds 
that they do not belong in a separate unit with the full-timers 
employed at the Community Health Division. As noted by Erie 
County, a unit of all part-time nurses has not been considered. 
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In the past, this Board dismissed a petition for a unit 
consisting of summer school teachers because it determined that 
the summer school teachers belonged more appropriately in the 
4/ 
existing unit of all-year teachers.— That decision did not 
add the summer school teachers to the unit of all-year teachers 
because the latter unit was then protected by a statutory 
5/ period of unchallenged representation.— Here, there is no 
period of unchallenged representation protecting the existing 
unit. On the contrary, the petition included a timely 
challenge to NYSNA's unit. 
We are not otherwise precluded from defining a unit that 
combines the 43 part-timers with all, or some of the employees 
' ~> 6/ 
) in the NYSNA unit.— However, we cannot do so on the record 
before us because alternative unit structures have not been 
addressed by the parties. Accordingly, we remand this matter 
for further proceedings. 
i./Great Neck Board of Education, 4 PERB 1P017 (1971). 
^The decision said: "It is our opinion that after the 
expiration of the period of unchallenged representation, 
representation should be on the basis of the combined unit." 
£/cSEA v. Helsby, 32 A.D.2d 131, 2 PERB ir70O7 (3d Dept. 
1969), aff'd. 25 N.Y.2d 842, 2 PERB ir7013 (1969); Great Neck 
Board of Education, supra. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that this matter be remanded to 
the Director for further proceedings. 
DATED: July 19. 19 8 5 
Albany. New York 
7^ A • A/^C 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies,NMember 
•*— A • 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2190 




ORGANIZATION OF STAFF ANALYSTS. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Organization of Staff 
Analysts has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named employer, in the unit described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
9811 
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collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Staff Analysts and Associate Staff 
Analysts. 
Excluded: Employees in the above titles found to 
be managerial or confidential and all 
other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Organization of Staff 
Analysts and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 19. 198 5 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies.\ Membe 
IA^AJ*^, ^ , ' 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memner 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
O PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2862 




LOCAL 144. DIVISION 100. SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION. 
AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Northport-East Northport 
Teacher Aide Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Teacher Aides 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Northport-East Northport 
Teacher Aide Association and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: July 19, 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-28 63 
NORTHPORT CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 144. DIVISION 100. SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Northport Clerical 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
•t; 
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settlement of grievances 
Unit: Included: Clerk, Clerk Typist, Stenographer, 
Senior Stenographer, Senior Clerk 
Typist. Account Clerk. Switchboard 
Operator. Senior Clerk. Duplicating 
Machine Operator, Account Clerk Typist. 
Photocopy Machine Operator, and 
Principal Stenographer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Northport Clerical 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of. and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 19. 1985 
Albany, New York 
Har,old R. Newman, Chairman 
David 
LAj^Uzz. A . 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memper 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST GENESEE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
—and- CASE NO. C-2870 
ONONDAGA COUNTY LOCAL 83 4. CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC., 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
WEST GENESEE CUSTODIAL ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Onondaga County Local 834, 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named employer, in the unit described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
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collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances, 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
custodial and laundry employees. 
Excluded: Superintendent of Buildings and 
Grounds. Head Custodians. Custodian I 
Maintenance Workers. Summer Employees 
Work Experience Employees. On-Call 
Employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Onondaga County Local 834, 
Civil Service Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of. and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 19. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membfer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREAT NECK WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2910 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Sewer Servicer; Laborer 
Excluded: All supervisory, clerical, mangerial or 
confidential employees. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of. 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 19. 19 8 5 
Albany, New York 
/ v ^ ^ g ^ ^ / ^ ^ 
<gfc-» 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Memb 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2 916 
LOCAL 21-S. PRODUCTION SERVICE AND 
SALES DISTRICT COUNCIL. H.E.R.E., 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 21-S. Production 
Service and Sales District Council, H.E.R.E.. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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grievances 
Unit: Included: Managers. Assistant Managers, 
Line/Telephone Supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 21-S, Production 
Service and Sales District Council, H.E.R.E.. AFL-CIO and enter 
into a written agreement with such employee organization with 
regard to terms and conditions of employment of the employees in 
the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such 
employee organization in the determination of, and administration 
of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 19. 1985 
Albany, New York 
TWs^&Y^ /fT A^tr •£-<4>-»<t^lSVL-^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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#3G-7/19/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCKPORT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2923 
LOCKPORT ADMINISTRATORS AND SUPERVISORS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter; by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Lockport Administrators and 
Supervisors Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Principals. Assistant Principals and 
Supervisor of Physical Education, 
Sports and Safety. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Lockport Administrators and 
Supervisors Association and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: July 19, 19 8 5 
Albany, New York 
. ^ ^ O - H y g ^ ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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